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“QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE
AND HARMONY”
OR “INJURED PLAINTIFF LITIGATION”?
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “CASES” IN
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION
Haoshan Ren, Margaret Wood, Clark D. Cunningham,
Noor Abbady, Ute Römer, Heather Kuhn, & Jesse
Egbert*
INTRODUCTION
If a federal official is deliberately violating the Constitution, is it
possible no federal court has the power to halt that conduct? Federal
judges have been answering “yes” for more than a century—
dismissing certain kinds of lawsuits alleging unconstitutional conduct
by ruling the lawsuits were not “cases” as meant in the phrase “[t]he
Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases” in Article III, Section Two,
of the Constitution.1
*
Haoshan Ren is a Ph.D. student in applied linguistics at Georgia State University. Margaret Wood is a
Ph.D. student in applied linguistics at Northern Arizona University. Clark D. Cunningham is a professor
at the Georgia State University College of Law. Noor Abbady is a professor of English as a Second
Language at the Savannah College of Art & Design and an instructor in the Department of World
Languages and Cultures at Georgia State University. Ute Römer is a professor in the Georgia State
University Department of Applied Linguistics and English as a Second Language. Heather Kuhn, J.D.
2019, is a Data Privacy and Security Consultant at Cox Communications. Jesse Egbert is a linguistics
professor at Northern Arizona University. The authors thank for their comments linguists Viviana Cortes,
Scott Crossley, Edward Finegan, Tammy Gales, Benjamin Lee, and Hans-Jörg Schmid and law professors
Michael C. Dorf, James E. Pfander, Robert J. Pushaw. Jr., and Susan Smelcer. The research reported in
this article was presented at a Workshop on Law & Linguistics, hosted by Georgia State University on
Friday, October 18, 2019. The PowerPoint and video from this presentation, including comments by Susan
Smelcer, are available at: http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Workshop-Law-Linguistics.html.
1. The full text of Section Two is:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens[,] or
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For example, in July 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit dismissed a lawsuit that the State of Maryland and the District
of Columbia brought against President Donald Trump claiming he is
deliberately violating the Constitution’s prohibition against receiving
emoluments from foreign states.2 The lawsuit alleged that foreign
governments pay substantial sums for using the Trump International
Hotel in Washington D.C. and that President Trump is sole owner of
the Trump Organization, which in turn owns that hotel.3 The court
said: “[T]he District and Maryland’s interest in constitutional
governance is no more than a generalized grievance, insufficient to
amount to a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.”4
In 1911, the United States Supreme Court declared: “[T]he exercise
of the judicial power is limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ . . . By
cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants . . . . The
term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.”5 The Supreme
Court subsequently further specified the meaning of “case” within the
meaning of Article III to include the following “essential core”: a
plaintiff who has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is
likely to be redressed by a judicial decision.6 Thus, at least in the civil
setting, the Court has restricted the meaning of “cases” to adversary
Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th
Cir. 2019) (mem.). At the time of writing, oral argument in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was scheduled for December 12, 2019. Id.
3. Id. at 362–63.
4. Id. at 379.
5. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911).
6. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Injury in fact is a constitutional
requirement.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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litigation initiated by a plaintiff with a personal and concrete injury—
in brief, “injured plaintiff litigation.”7
The claims of Maryland and the District of Columbia against
President Trump were dismissed by the Fourth Circuit without
consideration of the merits because, in the court’s view, the plaintiffs
had failed to show “concrete and particularized” injury that was
different than the alleged harm suffered by all citizens if the President
is corrupted by receipt of foreign payments.8 Failure to meet the
Supreme Court’s definition of “case” is described as a “lack of
standing.”9 Responding to the argument that if the District of Columbia
and Maryland “could not obtain judicial review of [the President’s]
action, ‘then as a practical matter no one can[,]’” the Fourth Circuit
cited the answer provided in a 1974 Supreme Court decision: “[The]
assumption that if [the plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”10
The empirical research reported in this article suggests that this
“injured plaintiff litigation” interpretation of the meaning of “cases”
may be more narrow—perhaps indeed entirely different—than how
the word in its Article III context would have been used and
understood by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution.
For the first two months of a constitutional convention that lasted
less than three-and-a-half months, various versions of what would
eventually become Section Two of Article III consistently provided
that federal courts should have the power to “hear and
determine . . . questions which may involve the national peace and
harmony.”11 On July 18, 1787, the Convention unanimously adopted
the following resolution proposed by James Madison: “[T]he

7. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
8. In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 378–79. The court also rejected claims that plaintiffs were injured based
on their ownership interests in convention centers that competed with the Trump Hotel, on their raising
the claims of their residents competing with the Trump Hotel, and on their interest in not being pressured
to grant favorable treatment to businesses owned by the President. Id. at 375–79.
9. Id. at 375–80.
10. Id. at 375 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982)).
11. See infra notes 120–145 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under
laws passed by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as
involve the National peace and harmony.”12
The authors of this article, comprised of a research team of lawyers
and linguists, used a variety of computer-aided methods for examining
very large data sets of Founding Era texts to explore linguistic
implications suggested to them by Madison’s July 18 resolution. This
research indicated that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution:
(1) Would have understood “cases arising under
laws” to be a type or example of “questions as
involve the National peace and harmony”;
(2) Would have understood “such other questions”
to be a more general category of jurisdiction than
“cases arising under laws”; and
(3) Would not have understood “cases” as having a
stable, inherent meaning such as “injured
plaintiff litigation”—instead “cases” in each
context of use in Article III would have been read
as having a different meaning, constructed
through its combination with accompanying
words.13
I. Legal Context and Relevance of Linguistic Analysis
As famously stated by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
in District of Columbia v. Heller, in interpreting the Constitution’s
text, courts “are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was
12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS II] (emphasis added). As to Madison’s authorship of this resolution, see infra notes
57–64 and accompanying text.
13. The linguistic description of this third finding is that “cases” was being used as part of a
“shell-noun phrase” and thus its meaning was vague and abstract requiring accompanying words to
provide a “shell content”; the combination of shell noun and shell content creates a complete concept but
one that is entirely contingent on the particular context of use. See infra notes 82–105 and accompanying
text.
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written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.’”14 As Justice Scalia explained in an equally famous speech,
the focus of constitutional interpretation should not be “original intent”
but rather “original meaning”: “What was the most plausible meaning
of the words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it—
regardless of what the Framers might secretly have intended?”15
Justice Scalia quoted in support of this position, a letter written by
James Madison, who has been described as the “master-builder of the
[C]onstitution”:16
[W]hatever respect may be thought due to the intention of
the Convention, which prepared [and] proposed the
Constitution, as presumptive evidence of the general
understanding at the time of the language used, it must be
kept in mind that the only authoritative intentions were those
of the people of the States, as expressed thro[ugh] the
Conventions which ratified the Constitution.17
In looking for “presumptive evidence of the general understanding
at the time of the language used,” courts have generally relied on
dictionary definitions and selected quotations from texts dating from
the period of ratification.18 This article presents a different approach
by applying the tools of linguistic analysis to “big data” about how
written language was used at the time of ratification.

14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
15. Antonin Scalia, Original Meaning, in SCALIA SPEAKS 180, 183 (Christopher J. Scalia & Edward
Whelan eds., 2017).
16. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (1913).
17. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut (May 1, 1830), in The Papers of James Madison,
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2034
[https://perma.cc/C24L-YJWP].
18. Id.; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 889–95 (D. Md. 2018), rev’d
sub nom. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019), and reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th
Cir. 2019) (discerning “original public meaning” of emolument from dictionaries and sixteen sentences
from a handful of 18th century texts).
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The science of linguistics has made dramatic progress in the past
thirty years due to developments in computer technology, making it
possible to acquire, store, and process large amounts of digitized data
representing actual language use.19 Such a data set, when used for
linguistic analysis, is called a corpus (plural: corpora).20 When
properly executed, corpus-based linguistic research meets the
scientific standards of generalizability, reliability, and validity.21
For empirical research into original meaning of the Constitution, the
standard of generalizability is met by use of a corpus sufficiently large
and varied that it represents—in the words of James Madison—the
“language used . . . [by] the people of the States” when the state
conventions ratified the Constitution.22 The authors have used the
Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).23 COFEA
contains in digital form over 126,000 texts created between 1760 and
1799, totaling more than 136,800,000 words.24 The texts in COFEA
come from six sources: the National Archive Founders Online,
HeinOnline, Evans Early American Imprints from the Text Creation
Partnership, Elliot–The Debates in the State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Farrand–Records of the Federal
Constitutional Convention of 1787, and the U.S. Statutes at Large from
the first five Congresses.25 The sample of Evans Early American
Imprints included in COFEA contains over 3,000 books, pamphlets,
19. See generally Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2018).
20. Id. at 1337.
21. Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Using Empirical Data to Investigate the Original Meaning
of “Emolument” in the Constitution, supra 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 474–75 (2020).
22. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17.
23. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU L. CORPUS LINGUISTICS,
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu [hereinafter COFEA]. COFEA was created by the J. Reuben Law School at
Brigham Young University. See Stephanie Francis Ward, New Web Platform Helps Users Research
Meanings of Words Used in Constitution, Supreme Court Opinions, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_web_platform_helps_users_research_meanings_of_words
_used_in_constitutio [https://perma.cc/HD32-X3MH]. Both the data in COFEA and basic online search
tools are freely available at: https://lawncl.byu.edu/. Access to COFEA requires registration using a
Google or Gmail account to guard against hacking.
24. See Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU L.: L. & CORPUS LINGUISTICS,
https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/ [https://perma.cc/WB8L-TZNJ].
25. Id.
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and other written materials published in America between 1760 and
1799.26 Founders Online is a free online resource maintained by the
National Archives, which provides digital copies of over 90,000
records found in the papers of six major figures of the founding era:
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison.27 Founders
Online contains official documents, diaries, and personal letters
written by and to these six persons. HeinOnline contains over 300 legal
materials published during the founding era; primarily federal and state
statutes, executive department reports, and legal treatises. 28
The reliability standard requires that a research method produce
consistent results, allowing a different researcher applying the same
method to duplicate the outcome. The results reported in this article
can be replicated by anyone who applies the computerized search
methods herein described to the identified databases.
Validity refers to how well the results from a method reflect
real-world patterns. Validity was built into the research reported here
by beginning with observations of systemic features of real language
use in the Founding Era, discovering patterns from the ground up (with
no preconceptions), and subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing
using the corpus data.
The origins of this article are in a research seminar paper written by
Heather Kuhn for a course taught by Clark Cunningham at the Georgia
State University College of Law in Atlanta, Georgia. Noor Abbady,
26. Id.; see also Evans Early American Imprints (Evans) TCP, TEXT CREATION PARTNERSHIP,
https://www.textcreationpartnership.org/tcp-texts/evans-tcp-evans-early-american-imprints/
[https://perma.cc/ZE92-BK4N] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (explaining that the Text Creation Partnership,
NewsBank/Readex Company, and the American Antiquarian Society created accurately keyed and fully
searchable text editions from among the 40,000 titles available in the Evans Early American Imprints
Collection of the American Antiquarian Society).
27. About
Founders
Online,
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/39W5-FRVZ] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). The Founders Online component of COFEA
contains 27,639,683 words, distributed as follows: Washington Papers 12,044,694; Adams Papers
7,274,489; Hamilton Papers 3,895,699; Franklin Papers 2,578,518; Jefferson Papers 1,726,603; and
Madison Papers 119,680. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), supra note 24. About
70% of the words in the Founders Online component of COFEA come from either the Washington Papers
(44%) or the Adams Papers (26%). Id.
28. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), supra note 24.
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then completing an M.A. in Applied Linguistics at Georgia State,29
was a research and teaching assistant to Cunningham and assisted
Kuhn in her linguistic research.
As an expert in data privacy and security, Kuhn was particularly
interested in the implications of the Supreme Court’s narrow
interpretation of “cases” for litigation brought by victims of data theft
and hacking (“data breaches”). Currently, federal courts of appeal
disagree as to what type of injury relating to a data breach must be
alleged to state a “case” within the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Article III.30
Data breach cases bring the Supreme Court’s position into sharp
relief—based on its interpretation of “cases”—that “a plaintiff [does
not] automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a
statute grants a person a right and purports to authorize that person to
sue to vindicate that right.”31 Thus, in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, the Court
considered a lawsuit under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), which provided that a consumer could sue for either actual
damages or statutory damages of $100–$1,000 per violation plus costs
29. One of the research and teaching foci of the GSU Department of Applied Linguistics and ESL
(http://alsl.gsu.edu) is Corpus Linguistics. Id. Four of the graduate faculty members in the department
(Viviana Cortes, Scott Crossley, Eric Friginal, and Ute Römer) specialize in this area.
30. Compare In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017)
(holding that Article III standing is established from the unauthorized dissemination of private information
as a de facto injury based on Congress passing the Fairness in Credit Reporting Act establishing that it
was an injury in and of itself), and Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the complaint satisfies Article III standing because the alleged theft of personal data placed
them at a continuing risk of fraud and identity theft), with Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., 883 F.3d 776
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Congress did not create a substantive right based on a statutory violation of
the Fairness in Credit Reporting Act and Article III standing was not established), Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of
Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that Article III standing existed for
plaintiffs alleging personal information was stolen in a data breach by showing injury in the form of outof-pocket costs due to the data breach and the time lost while waiting for a response from the defendant
over the fallout of the data breach), Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017)
(holding that the possible future threat of harm after credit card information was exposed following a data
breach at a retail store did not reach the level of a cognizable injury), and Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770
F.3d 978 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that the consumer’s injury was too speculative to establish standing
under Article III and dismissed the case).
31. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016); see Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to
Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2011); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis,
The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 226 (2012); Michael E. Solimine,
Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2009).
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and attorney fees.32 Thus, in an apparent effort to encourage consumers
to enforce the FCRA, Congress specifically authorized a consumer to
recover substantial statutory damages even if the consumer could not
recover “actual damages.”33 The Court insisted that its interpretation
of “cases” in Article III trumped the clear intent of Congress, holding
that a lawsuit alleging that a “web search engine” company had
disseminated incorrect information about him should still be
dismissed, unless the plaintiff could further allege the company’s
action caused him a “concrete” injury.34
Kuhn’s research raised questions in her mind as to whether the
doctrine of standing is actually a relatively recent addition to
constitutional law, rather than being rooted in the original meaning of
Article III. She noted that many legal scholars argue that standing
doctrine is a modern invention.35
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court appeared to
adopt a more generous notion of what constituted a case when
public-interested citizens challenged governmental action (or
inaction).36 Thus, in both Sierra Club v. Morton37 and United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 38 groups of
citizens challenging government actions as negatively impacting the
environment were found to have standing by alleging collective harms,
such as a likelihood to suffer a future injury.
However, the approach of considering lawsuits alleging collective
standing to meet the definition of “case” sharply changed with Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992. In Lujan, the U.S. Secretary of the

32. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1548.
35. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2017); see also Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen
Standing, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004).
36. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
37. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741.
38. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 690.
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Interior had distributed new interpretations of a provision of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973.39 As a result, consultations on
development were only required within the U.S. or on the high seas.40
The Defenders of Wildlife sought to obtain an injunction against this
interpretation claiming that a more limited consultation would
“increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened
species.”41 Like the situation in Spokeo, which cited Lujan, the Court
was unwilling to honor congressional intent to allow enforcement
lawsuits. Even though Congress had enacted a “citizen suit” provision
providing that “any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States . . . who is
alleged to be in violation of [the Endangered Species Act],” the Court
held:
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and every
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does
not state an Article III case or controversy.42
Questioning whether cases like Lujan and Spokeo were in fact
well-grounded in the original meaning of the Constitution, Kuhn,
assisted by Abbady, embarked on a study of data in COFEA to
investigate whether the word “case” was indeed closely associated
with the idea of injury in the Founding Era.43 Their research laid a
foundation for the work reported in this article.

39. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557 (1992).
40. Id. at 557–58.
41. Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 573–74.
43. Even though the Supreme Court consistently speaks of “case and controversy” as a single unit of
meaning, those two words appear in different parts of Article III; Kuhn and Abbady focused only on the
original meaning of case. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and
the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–49 (1994) (marshalling
historical evidence that in the Founding Era “case” and “controversy” invoked different court roles).
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Shortly after both Kuhn and Abbady graduated from Georgia State,
Cunningham became aware that a three-judge panel from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had ordered that the following
letter be sent on May 28, 2019, to the lawyers in Wright v. Spaulding,44
a case brought by a federal prisoner asking that his sentence be revised:
1. What is the original meaning of the Article III Cases or
Controversies requirement?
2. How does the corpus help inform that determination?
a. See https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/.
3. How does that original meaning relate to the distinction
between holding and dicta?
4. How does that ultimate determination relate to which test
in Hill should govern?45
This letter appeared to Cunningham to be the first time that an
American court had asked the parties in a case to do corpus-based
linguistic research and report the results. Cunningham asked Kuhn and
Abbady if they were interested in turning Kuhn’s seminar paper into a
friend of the court (amicus) brief, to be filed in support of neither party.
After Kuhn and Abbady indicated their interest, a research team,
comprised of the authors, assembled over the next three months.46 An
initial amicus brief of only twelve pages was submitted to the court on
July 25, 2019, along with a motion for leave to appear as amici. This
initial brief only reported the linguistic analysis of “such other
questions” discussed below in Section II.B.
In the motion for leave to appear as amici, the research team
indicated that page limitations and time constraints prevented them
from including all their research and that they were continuing to
analyze the usage of “case” and “cases” in the Founding Era. The
44. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019).
45. Letter to Counsel at 1, Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17-4257).
46. Cunningham and Egbert had previously collaborated on an amicus brief on the original meaning
of “emolument” that was submitted to the Fourth Circuit in support of neither party in In re Trump. See
Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Clark D. Cunningham and Professor Jesse Egbert on Behalf of Neither
Party, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2486), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36
(4th Cir. 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334017.
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research team, therefore, requested leave to file an additional
supplemental brief not to exceed twenty-five pages on or before
August 29, 2019.
On August 2, 2019, the three-judge panel entered an order
“direct[ing] the amici to file a supplemental brief no later than August
15, 2019.”47 This deadline was later extended to August 22.48 The
authors believe this order was the first time an American court had
directed a team including expert linguists to submit their corpus-based
research in the form of a brief.
The linguistic analysis supporting an alternative interpretation of
“cases” in Article III as a “shell noun”49 was developed in the three
weeks following the filing of the preliminary brief and became the
focus of a supplemental brief on August 22, 2019.
On September 19, 2019, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision in
Wright dismissing the petitioner’s habeas case.50 A footnote
acknowledged that “[a] team of corpus linguistics researchers
submitted two amicus briefs” and indicated that the court was “grateful
to . . . the amici for their hard work.”51 However, the court did not end
up addressing the original meaning of “cases or controversies” in
Article III in its opinion and made no substantive use of the research
reported in the two amicus briefs.
Nevertheless, well before the Wright decision came down, the
research team had moved forward to use the amicus research as the
foundation for this article.

47.
48.
4257).
49.
50.
51.

Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17-4257) (order granting motion to proceed as amicus curiae).
Letter to Counsel Granting Motion to Extend Filing Deadline at 1, Wright, 939 F.3d 695 (No. 17See infra Section II.C.
Wright, 939 F.3d at 697.
Id. at 700 n.1.
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II. A Linguistic Analysis of the Original Meaning of “Cases” in
Article III
A. Introduction
Searches for “case” and “cases” in the entire COFEA database
produce 93,255 and 31,840 hits, respectively. This is too large a
number for individualized qualitative analysis and is a daunting data
set for pattern searching. Methodological approaches include selecting
randomized samples, narrowing the search query, narrowing the
source material, and/or using sophisticated linguistic analysis tools to
look for recurrent patterns around the search term(s).
The research team’s first steps in determining whether linguistic
analysis might produce results worth reporting to the Wright panel
involved COFEA searches using queries where case52 appeared with
either a pre-modifying adjective (e.g., “criminal case”) or
post-modifying prepositional phrase (e.g., “cases of debt”). One of the
more fruitful queries appeared to be a search for the phrase “the case
of,” which was found to be a dominant pattern around the word “case.”
Although the team expected that this phrase would be productive of
examples where case meant something like “lawsuit” (e.g., “the case
of Smith v. Jones”), the search in fact produced many examples where
qualitative review suggested case had a broad, generic meaning not
related to “adversarial litigation.”
The next step involved a combination of narrowing the source
material and using analytical methods that go beyond what can be
accomplished with COFEA’s online tools. The team elected to apply a
widely-used tool called AntConc53 to search for significant recurrent
patterns. AntConc requires an offline corpus that can be loaded into the
tool. Fortunately, Cunningham had already employed a recent
graduate of Georgia State University’s Applied Linguistics Ph.D.

52. When italicized, case includes both the singular and plural form.
53. AntConc is a program for analyzing electronic texts (that is, corpora) in order to find and reveal
patterns
in
language.
AntConc,
LAURENCE
ANTHONY’S
WEBSITE,
https://www.laurenceanthony.net/software [https://perma.cc/8HJN-G3CE] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
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program to create an offline database taken from one of the COFEA
sources: the National Archives Founders Online.
Within the offline database derived from Founders Online, the
research team decided to focus on two sub-corpora: documents from
the National Archive collections of the papers of James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton from 1780–1789.54 Both men participated in
drafting the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention; Madison
has been described as the “master builder of the Constitution.”55
Based on the hypothesis that case might appear in similar syntactic
structures to “cause” and “suit” if it indeed referred to a lawsuit or
court proceeding, the team used AntConc to search for instances of
“case,” “cause,” and “suit” followed by the post-modifying features of
“case” appearing in the original drafting history (e.g., “of,” “which,”
“in which,” “arising,” etc.). These searches returned total occurrences
of post-modified “cause” and “suit” that provided sample sizes too
small (sixty-four and six respectively) for reliable analysis. A more
adequate sample was produced by searches for post-modified case—
over 400 occurrences. However, in the process of examining the
examples of post-modified case from the Madison corpus, the
direction of research shifted when the team focused on the following
passage
found
among
the
“cases
arising”
samples:
[T]he jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to
cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature,
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and
harmony . . . .56
The research team obtained this text from James Madison’s famous
notes of the Constitutional Convention, published after his death,
available in the Founders Online database.57 However, in the case of
54. Madison is the smallest corpus in the Founders Online component of COFEA.
55. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 196.
56. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39.
57. James Madison took “full and careful notes of the proceedings in the Convention,” but did not
allow them to be published until after his death in 1836. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 THE RECORDS OF
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this text, Madison’s notes conform to the rather cryptic official Journal
of the Convention published in 1818, based on papers transferred to
the Secretary of State by George Washington, who was the presiding
officer at the Convention.58
As the team further investigated the context of this text, they
discovered that it was an important predecessor of the final version of
Article III of the Constitution.
B. Analysis of “such other”
The Constitution was developed from fifteen resolutions introduced
during the first week of the Convention, on May 29, 1787, by the
Virginia delegation (the Virginia Plan).59 James Madison played a
major role in devising and promoting the Virginia Plan.60 Resolution
9 addressed the creation of a federal judiciary:
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear &
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal
to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies &
felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such
jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the
collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any
National officers, and questions which may involve the
national peace and harmony.61
On July 18, 1787, the Convention unanimously adopted the text
discovered by the research team as a simplified version of Resolution
9:

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xv (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS I] (“[A]ll other

records paled into insignificance [once Madison’s notes were published].”).
58. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786–
1870, at 48, 101 (U.S. Dep’t of State 1894). See RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xi-xii.
59. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 122.
60. RICHARD BEEMAN, THE PENGUIN GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2010).
61. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22.
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Original Resolution 9
“the jurisdiction of the inferior
tribunals shall be to hear &
determine in the first instance,
and of the supreme tribunal to
hear and determine in the dernier
resort, all piracies & felonies on
the high seas, captures from an
enemy;
cases
in
which
foreigners or citizens of other
States
applying
to
such
jurisdictions may be interested,
or which respect the collection
of the National revenue;
impeachments of any National
officers, and questions which
may involve the national peace
and harmony.”62

July 18 Replacement Resolution
“the jurisdiction of the national
Judiciary shall extend to cases
arising under laws passed by the
general Legislature,

and to such other questions as
involve the National peace and
harmony . . .”63

The official Journal did not record who proposed the replacement
resolution on July 18, but Madison’s notes indicate that it was his
proposal in response to “[s]everal criticisms having been made” of the
definition of the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary.64
On July 27, 1787, the Convention adjourned until August 6, so that
a Committee of Detail “might have time to arrange, and draw into
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by the
Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.”65 The July 18
replacement resolution was one of the “matters which had been agreed
to by the Convention” referred to this Committee. As discussed below,
62. Id. at 22.
63. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39.
64. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 279 (2007) [hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES].
65. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS III]; see also RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 65, 67.
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the draft reported back to the Convention by the committee became the
template for the Constitution.66
The team’s linguistic analysis focused on the relationship between
“cases arising under the laws passed by the general Legislature” and
“such other questions as involve the National peace and harmony” in
the July 18 replacement resolution. Based on the understanding of
“such other” in contemporary language use, one would interpret this
excerpt from the drafting history to mean that “cases arising under the
laws passed by the general Legislature” was a type or example of
“questions as involve the National peace and harmony.”
In order to determine whether this contemporary understanding of
the “such other” pattern was consistent with that of the Founding Era,
the research team then returned to COFEA to examine the frequency
and function of the “a . . . such other b” pattern in Founding Era
documents.
The preliminary search query, “such other */n (noun),” returned
2,821 hits dispersed throughout COFEA, appearing in every
sub-corpus, and in each time period. The frequency and extent of this
dispersion indicated that the phrase, “a . . . such other b,” was
commonly used and recognized in the Founding Era.
The research team then moved to an in-depth, qualitative analysis
of a random sample of 100 occurrences of the pattern generated from
COFEA sources. Analysis revealed both regular syntactic67 and
semantic68 features.
In assessing the semantic meaning of phrases in the form
“a . . . such other b”, it was clear to the research team that a is always
a type or example of b. Consider the following text regarding
extending navigation on the Potomac River found in the papers of
George Washington:

66. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xxiii.
67. Syntax describes how words are arranged to construct a sentence. See generally EDWARD
FINEGAN, LANGUAGE: ITS STRUCTURE AND USE (2015).
68. Semantics addresses the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences. See id.
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[T]he said president and directors . . . shall have full power
and authority . . . to cut such canals, and erect such locks,
and perform such other works as they shall judge necessary
for opening, improving, and extending the navigation of the
said river . . . .69
“Cut canals” and “erect locks” are examples of the general category of
“works” that can be done to improve navigation on a river.
Phrases using “such other” also have a set syntactic pattern, where
the more general term b always follows the more specific term(s) a.
Consider the following example:
The second plowing . . . will be turned upwards,
and . . . may be planted with potatoes or such other
vegetables as may best suit the judicious husbandman’s
inclination.70
Potatoes (a) is a specific example from the general category of
vegetables (b). The syntax cannot be reordered to say, “planted with
vegetables and such other potatoes.”
The research team carefully examined all 100 concordance lines
(i.e., instances of the search string, plus surrounding context) in the
random sample looking for counterexamples that might disconfirm
these hypotheses about the semantic and syntactic features of “such
other” phrases and found none.
The research team then conducted a second, more extended analysis
of the “such other” pattern in COFEA.71 For this second, more
labor-intensive analysis, results coming from the HeinOnline source in
69. Enclosure II: An Act for Opening and Extending the Navigation of Potowmack River (Oct. 18,
1784), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 240, 241 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1992) (emphasis added),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-02-02-0173-0003
[https://perma.cc/4XHY94JB].
70. JOHN SPURRIER, THE PRACTICAL FARMER 33 (1793) (emphasis added).
71. In order to broaden the search and gather varied forms in which the target phrase appeared, for
these next three sets the noun tag was removed from the search query so the search term was just “such
other.”
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COFEA were excluded. Currently, it is quite difficult to access the full
context of concordance lines obtained from HeinOnline through
COFEA, and the team wanted to be able to review the full context of
each occurrence.72
This second search returned 1,395 hits, appearing in a variety of
different forms. Three additional sets of 100 randomized lines were
extracted from the total of 1,395 hits and manually reviewed. In many
instances it was necessary to access the full context to find the “a” that
corresponded with the “b” following “such other.” Analysis of these
300 “such other” occurrences showed findings consistent with the
original sample of “such other */n,” suggesting that regardless of the
form that the phrase appears in, its function and meaning remain
consistent.
The team found five different forms of “a . . . such other b” in the
samples from the second search. Each form appeared in each of the
three samples at a similar frequency, suggesting an adequately
representative sample of the corpus. Forms and their reported
frequencies are presented in the chart below.
Sample A Sample B Sample C
“a . . . such other + noun (b)”

89

87

89

“a . . . such other + pre-modifier + noun (b)”

8

7

6

“a . . . such other + of the + noun (b)”

1

3

1

“a . . . such other + as”

1

1

3

“a. Such other b”

1

2

1

Total

100

100

100

72. Concordance lines based on HeinOnline source materials are also much more likely to contain
optical scanning errors and duplicate entries than search results from the other COFEA sources.
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The function of the phrase, “a such other b,” is consistent in all five
forms, where a is considered a type, or example of b. No robust
counterexamples were found within the three samples. In the following
examples of each of the five patterns discovered in the second search,
both a and b are bolded for identification.
1)

“a . . . such other + noun (b)”
[T]he hand and seal of the superintendent of the
department, or of such other person as the President of the
United States shall authorize to grant licenses for the
purpose[.]73

2)

“a . . . such other + pre-modifier + noun (b)”

In this form, the presence of the pre-modifier preceding the noun
clearly displayed no alteration of the meaning of the previous form.
[A]nd proper funds provided, for raising money to cultivate
our friendship with our Indian neighbors, and to support
such of our fellow subjects, who are or may be in distress,
and for such other like benevolent purposes[.]74
3)

“a . . . such other + of the + noun (b)”

The presence of the preposition before the noun here is clearly
stylistic, and while the form is different, the function of the form
remains unaltered.

73. Sample
B,
CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG
1,
14
l.
58
(Aug.
22,
2019),
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20B-annotated22Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/29DR-TGR4].
74. Id. at 8 l. 31.
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I have directed the Marshal . . . to have invoices and such
other of the shipping papers as are in the trunk faithfully
translated and authenticated and sent on to me[.]75
4)

“a . . . such other + as”

Although b is not explicitly stated in the phrase at all, it is naturally
understood by the reader based on our understanding of the meaning
of the phrase, “such other,” in context.
I afterwards wrote him another letter desiring expressly that
if this route was likely to retard much his attendance on
Congress, he would take such other as should be shortest.76
In the above example, the reader naturally understands the text as
“he would take such other route as should be shortest.”
5)

“a. Such other b”

In lines of this form, “Such other” begins a new sentence. a is still
present in the text preceding the sentence, and the meaning remains
unchanged.
The principal means in the hands of the genl. govmt. for
encouraging our own manufacturers is to ensure a preference
and encourage a demand for them by overcharging the
prices of foreign by heavy duties. Such other means of
encouragement as have not been confided to the general

75. Sample
A,
CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG
1,
13
l.
53
(Aug.
21,
2019),
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20A-annotated21Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW7R-XAYH].
76. Sample
C,
CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG
1,
1
l.
6
(Aug.
22,
2019),
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/JP/Wright-web/SuchOther_COFEA_Sample%20C(Annotated)22Aug2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM74-8XT7].
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government must be left with those of states, that each may
deal them out . . . .77
With no robust counterexamples appearing in the three 100-line
samples, the data show that regardless of the form in which the term,
“a . . . such other b” appears, the meaning and function of the phrase
remains unchanged where a is considered an example or type of b.
Further analysis revealed that not only did the form of the phrase,
“a . . . such other b,” vary without effect on the meaning, the specific
form and placement of a and b within the passage was similarly
without effect. While a often appeared as a single or compound noun
(ex. 1), it more frequently appeared in a form with multiple clauses
(ex. 2) that were later included by b. This variation in the form of a
had no effect on the function of the “a . . . such other b.” Consider the
two examples below:
ex. 1: [T]he persons I have named be permitted, on the
morrow, to come before your majesty, in the presence of
Don Juan, and such other persons as your majesty may
think fit . . . .78
ex. 2: As I have observed before, Mr. Dodge appears to me
a valuable intelligencer; and, if Congress are pleased to
honor him with an opportunity, he will give them an account
of the posts of Detroit and Niagara when he left them,
and of that at Michilimachinac,—of the enemy’s naval
force on Lakes Erie and Ontario, and of such other
matters in Canada as he was able to inform himself of . . . .79
Similarly, while a often appeared in a series with b (ex. 3), it more
frequently appeared somewhere in the text preceding b (ex. 4). Further

77. Sample B, supra note 73, at 10 l. 40.
78. Id. at 16 l. 66.
79. Sample C, supra note 76, at 9 l. 49.
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examination of these instances similarly showed no effect on the
function of the phrase. Consider the examples below:
ex. 3: This is true, but in order to make this Demand, France
must agree by Treaty to open all her Ports in the west Indies,
to give us a Right to import into them Flour, Bread,
Tobacco, and such other articles as Great Britain shall
permit[.]80
ex. 4: Courts of sessions, common pleas, and orphans
courts shall be held quarterly in each city and county; and
legislature shall have power to establish all such other courts
as they may judge for the good of the inhabitants of the
state[.]81
Applying these research findings to the July 18 resolution leads to
these conclusions:
(1) For the members of the Convention who considered and
unanimously adopted the July 18 resolution, (a) “cases
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature”
was a type or example of (b) “questions as involve the
National peace and harmony;” and
(2) “other questions as involve the National peace and
harmony” (b) was a more general category of jurisdiction
than “cases arising under laws passed by the general
Legislature” (a).
Due to time and space constraints, the linguistic analysis reported in
the initial amicus brief submitted to the Wright panel was largely
limited to these findings about the use of the “such other” pattern.

80. Sample A, supra note 75, at 1 l. 2.
81. Sample C, supra note 76, at 4 l. 25.
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C. Case Used as a Shell Noun
After filing the preliminary brief, the team returned to a further
bottom-up analysis of the public papers of James Madison,82 this time
using AntConc to look generally for phrases containing “case” or
“cases” that were of high frequency. The team considered a phrase to
be of “high frequency” if it appeared more than fifty times and in more
than ten different texts.83
This search produced 8,900 examples of “case” and 3,024 examples
of “cases.” Analyses showed that uses of both “case” and “cases” were
highly patterned, meaning both words occurred repeatedly in the same
phrases. Over 79% of all occurrences of “case” (7,066/8,900) appeared
in one of twenty-three highly frequently recurrent phrases; 36% of all
occurrences of “cases” (1,088/3,024) appeared in one of ten frequently
recurrent phrases.84 Random samples respectively for “case” and
“cases,” each containing one-fifth of the total examples of each word,
were then subjected to line-by-line manual review.
The manual review brought to mind the term “shell noun,”
introduced by Hans-Jörg Schmid.85 Schmid developed this
terminology to help explain why many of the most commonly used
nouns in English can be hard to define.86 In listing such nouns, Schmid
begins the list with case on two separate occasions.87
When a word is used as a shell noun, it is hard to define because the
noun becomes semantically abstract and vague, and is not used to bring
a specific inherent meaning to the context but instead serves to
82. For this analysis, the team did not restrict itself to a particular time period but searched all the
public papers of James Madison downloaded from Founders Online (27,416 files containing 10,876,580
words).
83. The second criterion excludes phrases that appear more than fifty times but only in a few
documents.
84. Tables listing all these patterns can be found in an online appendix posted in the Original Meaning
of Cases. The Original Meaning of “Cases” in Article III of the US Constitution,
CLARKCUNNINGHAM.ORG,
http://www.clarkcunningham.org/MeaningOfCases.html
[https://perma.cc/N55J-UCBD] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Meaning of Cases].
85. HANS-JÖRG SCHMID, ENGLISH ABSTRACT NOUNS AS CONCEPTUAL SHELLS: FROM CORPUS TO
COGNITION 13 (2000).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3, 6.
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introduce and characterize what Schmid calls “chunks of
information”88 found elsewhere in that context. The noun functions to
form a “shell” around such (often complex) “chunks of information,”
which are “contained” within that “shell” providing the “shell
content.”89 Thus, when a noun like case is used as a shell noun, it
creates in combination with the shell content a complete notion, but
one that is entirely contingent on the particular context of use.
Consider the following two examples used in the same text, a letter
written by Madison in 1805 when he served as Secretary of State in
the Jefferson Administration:
In all cases where there may be no special grounds for
suspecting an escape of the offender, by the departure of
the vessel of war, or the removal of him beyond the reach
of your warrant, you are to take no step towards applying
the extraordinary force authorised by the law, until you shall
receive such further directions as the President shall, in
consequence of your report, think proper to be given.90
Whatever may be the result of these proceedings, you are,
without delay, to transmit a full and exact report thereof to
this department; and even to report for the information of the
President, any important circumstance which may occur in
the course of them; particularly in cases where there may
possibly be time for his directions thereon to be received
and pursued.91
The shell content in each example is bolded and is notably complex,
especially in the first example. The significance of “cases” is clearly
different in the first and second example, even though occurring in the

88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Circular Letter to the Marshals (May 29, 1805), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 414, 415
(Mary
A.
Hackett
et
al.
eds.,
2011)
(emphasis
added),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-09-02-0465 [https://perma.cc/KL9H-NR7A].
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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same short letter, because the shell content is different for each use of
“cases.” Looking at the second example, it is particularly clear that
“cases” does not bring any inherent meaning to the sentence; the
bolded shell content is necessary to give meaning to “cases.” If the
shell content is removed, the concluding phrase, “particularly in
cases,” no longer makes sense.
Schmid conducted a systematic empirical analysis of a very large
corpus of contemporary English to identify patterns likely to signal the
usage of a shell-noun phrase.92 One of the strongest patterns he found
was “noun” + “‘wh’ word” (where, when, why) + clause,93 which is
the pattern seen in both examples above. The research team found
eighty-two examples of the pattern, “in cases where,” in the Madison
corpus, typically followed by a clause. It was seeing patterns like this
that brought the shell-noun theory to mind.
The team’s manual review of one-fifth of the samples of “case” and
“cases” in the Madison corpus generally confirmed that case was used
pervasively as a shell noun in ways consistent with Schmid’s analysis
of the use of shell-noun phrases in contemporary English.94
When considering a text from the Founding Era that clearly has a
legal context—like Article III—a reader may be “primed”95 to assume
that case brings to the context an inherent meaning, like “adversarial
litigation.” However, a careful reading of the entire context may reveal
that the meaning of case has to be understood instead as forming a
“shell” around content found elsewhere in the text. Take, for example,
this phrase from the Articles of Confederation in the section setting out

92. See SCHMID, supra note 85, at 38–62.
93. Id. at 22, 44. A clause can be extracted from the sentence in which it is embedded and expressed
as an independent, complete sentence, and therefore must always include a verb phrase, e.g., “There may
possibly be time for his directions thereon to be received and pursued” extracted from the second example
quoted above. See generally DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD, & GEOFFREY LEACH, LONGMAN
STUDENT GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH (2002).
94. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for additional sample shell-noun phrases from the Madison
Papers.
95. Words can be “primed” for semantic association; such priming is sensitive to the domain in which
a word is encountered. Michael Hoey, Lexical Priming and the Properties of Text, in CORPORA AND
DISCOURSE 385 (A. Partington et al. eds., 2004). Thus, priming to associate “case” with “adversarial
litigation” is particularly likely if the reader has legal training.
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a very complicated process for resolving disputes between two states:
“the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case
transmitted to congress.”96 Read in isolation and preceded by
“judgment,” “sentence,” and “proceedings,” “either case” could easily
be interpreted by a twenty-first century reader as referring to two
alternate instances of litigation. But when the fuller context is
examined, it becomes clear that “either case” instead refers to two
complicated contingencies peculiar to this particular context, which
together provide the essential shell content for “either case”:
Contingency 1: [I]f either party shall neglect to attend at the
day appointed, without showing reasons, which congress
shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike,
the congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of
each state, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf
of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and
sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before
prescribed, shall be final and conclusive[.] . . .97
Contingency 2: [A]nd if any of the parties shall refuse to
submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend
their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to
pronounce sentence, or judgment, which shall in like manner
be final and decisive[.] . . .98
At this point the research team had reached a working hypothesis
that there is a plausible alternative to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “cases” in Article III as meaning “injured plaintiff
litigation.” That alternative interpretation is that “cases” in Article III
functions as part of shell-noun phrases. “Cases” would thus bring no
inherent meaning to its use in Article III and would have different
meanings for each differing shell content in that text.

96. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
97. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
98. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
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To test this hypothesis, the research team conducted a top-down,
computerized search of the entire COFEA database for every text using
one of the three patterns that follow the Article III phrase, “the judicial
power shall extend to”: (1) all cases arising, (2) all cases affecting, and
(3) all cases of.99 This search produced seventy-nine examples of “all
cases arising,” fifty examples of “all cases affecting,” and 608
examples of “all cases of.”
Because of the small number of examples for “arising” and
“affecting,” the team was able to conduct a comprehensive manual
review. First, each example was classified as to whether it was either
an exact duplicate of the Article III text or obviously a discussion of
that text, leaving a remainder to be analyzed:
Duplicate of
Article III

Example is
discussing
Article III

Remainder

Total

arising

49

25

5

79

affecting

42

6

2

50

This result suggests that the formulations “all cases arising” and “all
cases affecting” were very unusual in the Founding Era outside the
specific context of Article III, though they did occur.
Analysis of the remaining examples, including examination of
surrounding text in the original sources, indicated that every use in the
full COFEA database of either “all cases arising under” or “all cases
affecting” that was not derived from Article III was a shell-noun
phrase.100 Take, for example, this excerpt from a medical treatise:
It is evident to the most superficial observer, that the
sensibility, and irritability of every part of the body, are
99. For “arising” and “affecting,” the search captured all phrases in which “all cases” preceded the
verb by up to five words, accounting for the possibility of intervening words such as the phrase “both in
law and equity,” which separates “all cases” from “arising” in Article III.
100. Each example was independently classified as a shell-noun phrase by Ren, Abbady, and
Cunningham using common criteria derived from Schmid. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for all
seven “remainder” examples. One of the five examples in the “arising” chart appears twice because it was
downloaded from two different sources.
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rendered less susceptible of impressions, by the use of
opium.
In all cases of pain arising from any cause, except that
from inflammation, it is a sure and never failing palliative,
and generally succeeds in procuring sleep, if given in doses
sufficiently large . . . .101
According to this analysis, then, if the Supreme Court’s
interpretation is applied to “all cases arising” and “all cases affecting”
in Article III, Article III would be the only text among the over 126,000
texts in COFEA where these phrases were not shell-noun usages.
Turning to the much larger set of 608 examples of “all cases of,” the
first step reduced the number of examples by about one-third by
removing all texts downloaded from HeinOnline. Because
identification of whether an example was a shell-noun phrase often
included viewing the full original contexts in the underlying source,
HeinOnline-sourced examples were removed because of the difficulty
in accessing full original texts from HeinOnline through COFEA.102
For the next step, the team extracted from the remaining 336
examples of “all cases of” three random samples of twenty
concordance lines per sample, a total of sixty lines.103 Manual review
of each randomized sample set indicated that every line represented
the use of case as a shell-noun phrase.104 Take for example:

101. WILLIAM CURRIE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAUSES AND CURE OF REMITTING OR BILIOUS
FEVERS 75 (Philadelphia, William T. Palmer 1798) (emphasis added).
102. Two hundred forty-two HeinOnline-based lines were excluded from the total data set of 608.
Texts sourced from HeinOnline also present far more instances of duplicated lines and severe Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) corruption making recourse to the underlying texts all the more necessary.
The research team did not believe that exclusion of HeinOnline-sourced lines rendered the remaining
examples unrepresentative of Founding Era usage; nonetheless, all the excluded HeinOnline concordance
lines are posted on the Meaning of Cases website.
103. The random samples were extracted from Excel file by using the function EXCEL “= RAND( )”.
A column containing this function was inserted in the original spreadsheet of 335 lines, then, to extract
three samples, the sorting function was used with each time a new random number was automatically
assigned to each row by the function = RAND().
104. Each example was initially classified as a shell-noun phrase by Ren, then double-checked by
Abbady; Cunningham provided occasional consultation. See Meaning of Cases, supra note 84 for tables
displaying each randomized sample set.
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[T]he court of wardens shall and may have, hold, and exercise, the
same powers and authorities in all cases of debt or damage, by
whatever means sustained, and which do not exceed in value
20 / (except where the title to lands may come in question,) as
the judges of the court of common pleas or admiralty have,
hold, or do exercise, in their respective jurisdictions.105

III. Applying Linguistic Analysis to Founding Era Texts
A. Predecessor Texts to the Constitution
During the drafting process, the Constitutional Convention relied
significantly on the Articles of Confederation and state
constitutions.106 In this section, we look at the use of case in the
Articles of Confederation and in two influential state constitutions as
evidence of language use that can be considered comparable to how
those who drafted and ratified the U.S. Constitution used language. We
find in these documents that case was used often and apparently as a
shell noun.
Case appears six times in the Articles of Confederation and is used
each time as an abstract noun that acquires significance only through
its combination with one or more accompanying phrases.
In two occurrences, the information that completes the meaning
follows case:
(1) [R]ules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or
water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land
or naval forces in the service of the united states shall be
divided or appropriated . . . .
(2) [E]stablishing courts for receiving and determining finally
appeals in all cases of captures . . . .

105. Zylstra v. Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 394 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794) (emphasis added).
106. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 127–29.
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In two other instances, the complementary information immediately
precedes case:
(3) [U]nless such state be infested by pirates, in which case
vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion . . . .
(4) [U]nless the legislature of such state shall judge that such
extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in
which case they shall raise officer, cloath, arm and equip as
many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared.
And in two occurrences, very complex information precedes case,
in one instance in a completely different article:
(5) [I]f either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed,
without showing reasons, which congress shall judge
sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the
congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each
state, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf of
such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and
sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before
prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the
parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court,
or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall
nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence, or judgment, which
shall in like manner be final and decisive, the judgment or
sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted
to congress . . . .
(6) Article VI: No state shall engage in any war without the consent
of the united states in Congress assembled, unless such state be
actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain
advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of
Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent
as not to admit of a delay till the united states in congress
assembled can be consulted: nor shall any state grant
commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque
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or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the
united states in congress assembled, and then only against
the kingdom or state and the subjects thereof, against which
war has been so declared, and under such regulations as
shall be established by the united states in congress
assembled . . . .
....
Article IX: The united states in congress assembled, shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth
article . . . .107
The famous 1776 Constitution of Virginia, adopted even before the
Declaration of Independence, uses case a number of times, but always
as part of a shell-noun phrase that is obviously not referring to
adversarial litigation.108
That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence of a free State; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all
cases the military should be under strict subordination to,
and governed by, the civil power.109
....

Whereas George the third, King of Great Britain and Ireland,
and elector of Hanover, heretofore intrusted with the
exercise of the kingly office in this government, hath
endeavoured to prevent, the same into a detestable and
insupportable tyranny, by putting his negative on laws the
most wholesome and necessary for the public good[.]
....

107. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, IX.
108. See generally VA. CONST. of 1776.
109. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 13.
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For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring
themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all
cases whatsoever[.]
....

A Governor, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually by
joint ballot of both Houses (to be taken in each House
respectively) deposited in the conference room; the boxes
examined jointly by a committee of each House, and the
numbers severally reported to them, that the appointments
may be entered (which shall be the mode of taking the joint
ballot of both Houses, in all cases) . . . . [The Governor]
shall, with the advice of the Council of State, have the power
of granting reprieves or pardons, except where the
prosecution shall have been carried on by the House of
Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct: in
which cases, no reprieve or pardon shall be granted, but by
resolve of the House of Delegates.
....
. . . They shall annually choose, out of their own members, a

President, who, in case of death, inability, or absence of the
Governor from the government, shall act as
Lieutenant-Governor.
....
. . . In case of death, incapacity, or resignation, the

Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, shall appoint
persons to succeed in office, to be approved or displaced by
both Houses. . . .
The Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, shall
appoint Justices of the Peace for the counties; and in case of
vacancies, or a necessity of increasing the number hereafter,
such appointments to be made upon the recommendation of
the respective County Courts. . . . In case of vacancies,
either by death, incapacity, or resignation, a Secretary shall
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be appointed, as before directed; and the Clerks, by the
respective Courts.
....
. . . In case of vacancies, the Speaker of either House shall

shall [sic] issue writs for new elections.110
In the section stating that trial by jury “ought to be held sacred,” the
Virginia Constitution uses the words “controversies” and “suits” rather
than “cases.”111
That in controversies respecting property, and in suits
between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable
to any other, and ought to be held sacred.112
The state constitution considered to have the greatest influence on
the drafting of the U.S. Constitution was the 1780 Constitution of
Massachusetts, largely written by John Adams.113 In a provision
apparently based on the Virginia protection of the right to trial by jury,
Adams also used “controversies” and “suits” and added the word
“causes”:
Art. XV. In all controversies concerning property, and in all
suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which
it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the
parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of
procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on
the high seas, and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the
legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it.114

110. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16.
111. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11.
112. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11.
113. John Adams & the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/guides/johnadams-the-massachusetts-constitution [https://perma.cc/ND2A-F6RH] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
114. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XV.
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The word “cases” also appears once in this provision, which is part of
a prefatory “Declaration of Rights,” but can be seen as functioning as
part of a shell-noun phrase.
When later in the Massachusetts Constitution its Article III
establishes the judicial power, it uses a laundry list of words but does
not include “cases”:
Art. III. The general court shall forever have full power and
authority to erect and constitute judicatories and courts of
record or other courts . . . for the hearing, trying, and
determining of all manner of crimes, offences, pleas,
processes, plaints, actions, matters, causes, and things
whatsoever.115
B. Drafting History of the Constitution
We now return to a more extensive review of the drafting history of
Article III at the Constitutional Convention. In the course of this
review, we feel that we have reconstructed a useful narrative of how
Article III came to take its final form, and in particular how the drafters
made the transition from talking in terms of “questions as involve the
National peace and harmony” to instead using “cases” recurrently.
Although it might appear in some parts of this section that we are
trying to infer the intent of some of the delegates, we are doing so
primarily in the context of trying to understand their language usage.
As Madison advised, the words used by “[those who] prepared and
proposed the Constitution” can be considered as “presumptive
evidence of the general understanding at the time of the language
used.”116
Reviewing texts from the Constitutional Convention reveals a
number of examples of language use consistent with an interpretation
that “cases” was being used as a shell noun. Indeed, the shell-noun
interpretation provides a plausible explanation for statements by
delegates that would otherwise be puzzling if “cases” was being used
115. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 1, § 1, art. III (emphasis added).
116. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17.
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and understood as having the “injured plaintiff litigation” meaning the
Supreme Court assumed was intended.
As discussed above, Article III has its origins in the ninth of fifteen
resolutions introduced on May 29, 1787, during the first week of the
Constitutional Convention by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph
on behalf of the Virginia delegation—the Virginia Plan.117 Resolution
9 proposed that “a National Judiciary be established to consist of one
or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by
the National Legislature.”118 The “jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals”
was to hear and determine in the first instance:
[1] all piracies & felonies on the high seas, [2] captures from
an enemy; [3] cases in which foreigners or citizens of other
States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or
which respect the collection of the National revenue; [4]
impeachments of any National officers, and [5] questions
which may involve the national peace and harmony.119
The supreme tribunal would have jurisdiction to hear and determine
such matters “in the dernier resort.”120
Resolution 9 used case to describe only one of five categories of
jurisdiction. This use, for the third category, occurs in what Schmid
identified as a shell-noun pattern—“noun + which”—that occurs with
case.121 This use of case appears to form a “shell” around two very
different, complicated ideas that form the “shell content”: (1)
situations of interest to foreigners and “citizens of other states applying
to such jurisdiction”; and (2) situations “respect[ing] the collection of
the National revenue.”
The first part of this shell content seems to identify “foreigners or
citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions” as the persons
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
SCHMID, supra note 85, at 289.
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who would be able to invoke federal jurisdiction, but the basis for
invoking jurisdiction is stated as whether such persons “may be
interested,” a phrase that seems quite distant from the Supreme Court’s
insistence that federal courts are only available to plaintiffs who have
suffered a concrete and particularized injury.122
The second part of this shell content reads “cases . . . which respect
the collection of National revenue,” a jurisdictional category that has
no apparent connection with the first part other than being within the
same shell-noun phrase introduced by “cases.”123 However, it is in fact
characteristic of shell-noun phrases to combine two or more very
different ideas into a single complex concept, the meaning of which is
entirely specific to that particular context.124 It is not at all clear who
would be able to invoke federal jurisdiction “respect[ing] the
collection of National revenue” and what federal courts would be
expected to do in relation to such matters. Like the first part of the shell
content, this second part does not obviously refer to “injured plaintiff
litigation.”
For the last jurisdictional category, Resolution 9 used a phrase
beginning with the word “questions.” According to Schmid,
“question” is very commonly used in contemporary English as a shell
noun, and the construction “noun + which” is also a typical shell-noun
pattern.125 “Questions” in the fifth category certainly appears to be a
vague and abstract noun that functions to form a shell around a
complex set of ideas: “which may involve the national peace and
harmony.”
The analysis presented above about the use of “such other” in the
phrase “cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature,
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and
harmony” indicated that the Convention delegates understood “cases
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature” to be a type or
example of the more general jurisdictional category, “questions as
involve the National peace and harmony.” Our shell-noun analysis
122.
123.
124.
125.
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indicates that if “case” or “question” are being used as shell nouns, the
meaning of the phrase they introduce comes primarily from the
shell-noun content and not from the vague noun that introduces the
phrase. If we combine the insights from both analyses, we would not
be surprised if the drafters used “cases involving national peace and
harmony” and “questions involving national peace and harmony” to
express the same concept. And indeed, we find two examples where
influential delegates did shift from talking about “questions involving
national peace and harmony” to “cases involving national peace and
harmony” while still apparently referring to the same concept.
1.

Shifting from Questions to Cases: Example One

The first example comes from reported discussion of a revised
version of Resolution 9, which Governor Randolph and James
Madison offered on June 13, 1787:
[T]he jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to [1]
cases which respect the collection of the national revenue,
[2] impeachments of any national officers, and [3] questions
which involve the national peace and harmony.126
The jurisdiction that would be established by this resolution can be
interpreted as described by two shell-noun phrases, introduced
respectively by “cases” and “questions,” plus the specific category
identified by the noun “impeachments.”
According to Madison’s notes, on June 16, 1787, James Wilson of
Pennsylvania127 rose to compare the June 13 resolution by Randolph
and Madison with a very different proposal for federal courts
introduced as part of a June 15 resolution by William Patterson of New
126. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 223–24.
127. Wilson, an accomplished lawyer and one of the most influential delegates at the Convention,
was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Independence and served on the Convention’s
Committee of Detail, as discussed below. He was one of the first persons appointed to the Supreme Court
by George Washington and also served as the first professor of law at the College of Philadelphia (the
predecessor of the University of Pennsylvania). See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 21.
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Jersey. As Randolph was the spokesperson for the “large states”
Virginia Plan, Patterson was the proponent for the “New Jersey Plan,”
offered as a “small states” alternative.128 Wilson said:
Here [in the Randolph/Madison resolution,] the jurisdiction
is to extend to all cases affecting the Natl. peace &
harmony:—there [in the Patterson resolution,] a few cases
only are marked out.129
The brief statement by Wilson is consistent with the linguistic
analysis of this article in two ways. First, his statement suggests that
he understood “questions which involve the national peace and
harmony” to be a general jurisdictional category that included more
specific categories that preceded it, such as the category introduced
with the word “cases.” Thus, Wilson collapsed the three different
jurisdictional categories, listed in the June 13 resolution, into one
category, using the phrase “affecting the National peace and
harmony.”
Second, the statement by Wilson also suggests that he considered
“cases affecting the national harmony” as including the same concept
as “questions affecting the national harmony.” He described the
federal jurisdiction proposed by Randolph and Madison by quoting the
language of their resolution referring to “National peace and
harmony,” but substituted “cases” where the June 13 resolution used
“questions”:
June 13 Resolution
“the jurisdiction of the national
Judiciary shall extend to cases
which respect the collection of
the
national
revenue,

Wilson’s Paraphrase
“the jurisdiction is to extend to
all cases affecting the Natl.
peace & harmony”131

128. Id. at 84–90.
129. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 252.
131. Id. at 252.
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impeachments of any national
officers, and questions which
involve the national peace and
harmony.”130
2. Shifting from Questions to Cases: Example Two
On June 19, 1787, the Convention voted to reject the New Jersey
Plan and report out the resolutions offered by Governor Randolph on
June 13.132 On July 18, the Convention unanimously approved a
resolution presented by James Madison to amend the June 13
resolution to read: “the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall
extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general Legislature,
and to such other questions as involve the National peace and
harmony.”133
On July 27, 1787, the Convention adjourned until August 6, so that
a Committee of Detail “might have time to arrange, and draw into
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by the
Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.”134 The
Committee of Detail was comprised of five delegates: Governor
Randolph, James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth (a judge of the Connecticut
Supreme Court), Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts (a former
president of the Continental Congress), and John Rutledge (former
Governor of South Carolina).135
No official journal of this Committee’s proceedings exists;
however, a number of documents apparently relating to the
Committee’s work have survived.136 One such document was
handwritten by Governor Randolph. Max Farrand, who prepared the
130. Id. at 231.
132. RECORDS III, supra note 65, at 312–13.
133. Id.; see also RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 39. The official Journal did not record who made this
second motion, which also passed unanimously, but Madison’s Notes indicate that it was his proposal, in
response to “several criticisms having been made” on the definition of the jurisdiction of the national
judiciary. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64.
134. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 65; RECORDS III, supra note 65, at 65, 67.
135. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 16–35, 122.
136. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 129.
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authoritative compilation of the Convention’s records,137 provides this
explanation for the Randolph document:
[Although] little has been known of how the committee set
about the preparation of its report.
....
. . . it seems probable that one of the first steps taken was to
have some one of their [members] prepare a preliminary
sketch of a constitution as a working basis upon which the
committee could proceed. . . . In view of the part he had
taken first in presenting and at various times in expounding
on the Virginia plan, Randolph was a very natural person to
whom this duty should be assigned. . . . [W]e have in
Randolph’s handwriting what is evidently the first draft of a
constitution based specifically upon the resolutions the
convention had adopted.138
Randolph’s draft includes a section that begins “insert the II article”
and in that section, below a heading entitled “The Judiciary,” appears
Paragraph 7.139 In drafting Paragraph 7, he apparently was working
from the July 18 Resolution. The first seven lines of his draft largely
parallel the July 18 Resolution, with four changes: (1) the grant of
jurisdiction is changed from “the national judiciary” to “the supreme
tribunal”;140 (2) “impeachments of officers” is added after “cases
arising under laws”; (3) “such other questions” is changed to “such
other cases”; and (4) “such other cases” is modified by the phrase “as
the national legislature may assign.”141

137. See generally RECORDS I, supra note 57; RECORDS II, supra note 12.
138. FARRAND, supra note 16, at 124–25.
139. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 144–46.
140. In the subsequent Paragraph 8, Randolph’s draft would leave to the discretion of Congress
whether to extend the jurisdiction extended to the “supreme tribunal” to “inferior tribunals”: “The whole
or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid according to the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the
inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.” Id. at 147.
141. Id. at 146–47.
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July 18
Resolution
“the jurisdiction
of the national
Judiciary shall
extend to cases
arising
under
laws passed by
the
general
Legislature, and
to such other
questions
as
involve
the
National peace
and
harmony.”142

Randolph’s Draft
“The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall
extend
1 to all cases, arising under laws passed by the
general (Legislature)
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national
legislature may assign, as involving the
national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens
of different states
in disputes between a State & a Citizen or
Citizens of another State
in disputes between different
states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned
(& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn)
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be
appellate only, except in <Cases of Impeachmt.
&(in)> those instances, in which the legislature
shall make it original. and the legislature shall
organize it” 143

Since the Committee of Detail’s task was to implement the
resolutions approved by the Convention, and two resolutions
introduced by Randolph himself extended federal jurisdiction to
“questions involving national peace and harmony,”144 it seems
142. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 146–47 (emphasis added) (pattern of indentation in original).
144. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (discussing Resolution 9 of the Virginia Plan
introduced May 29, 1787); supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution introduced
June 13, 1787).
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unlikely that Randolph intended to make a substantive change in
federal jurisdiction when he replaced “questions” in the July 18
Resolution with “cases” in his draft for the Committee of Detail. It
seems far more likely that, like his fellow Committee of Detail member
James Wilson,145 Randolph considered he could construct a phrase
beginning with either “cases” or “questions” to refer to the same
concept of federal jurisdiction.
In Randolph’s draft, the pattern of indentation (reproduced in the
table above) suggests that the phrases that follow “such other cases, as
the national legislature may assign, as involving the national peace and
harmony”—e.g., collection of revenue, disputes between citizens of
different states—were considered by him to be examples of questions
or cases that involve national peace and harmony.
3. Madison’s Puzzling Objection to “Cases Arising Under the
Constitution”
On August 6, 1787, the Convention reconvened to receive the
Committee’s proposed draft of the Constitution.146 Article X of the
Committee’s draft bears strong resemblance to the draft Randolph
wrote for the Committee; however, the phrase “involving the national
peace and harmony” has disappeared as has the reference to
“collection of revenue.”147
Randolph’s Draft148
Art. X, Committee Draft149
“The jurisdiction of the supreme
“The Jurisdiction of the
tribunal shall extend
Supreme Court shall extend
to all cases arising under laws
passed by the Legislature of the

145. See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson’s speech to the Convention
on June 16, 1787).
146. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 176.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 146–47.
149. Id. at 186. This text of the Committee’s report comes from Madison’s notes; however, his
numbering of the articles differs from extant copies of the original printed report. Id. at 177 n.2. Madison
numbered this section as Article XI; the printed original numbered it as Article X. Id. at 177 n.1, 186.
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1 to all cases, arising under laws
passed
by
the
general
‹Legislature›
2. to impeachments of officers,
and
3. to such other cases, as the
national legislature may assign,
as involving the national peace
and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes
between citizens of different
states
‹in disputes between a State & a
Citizen or Citizens of another
State›
in disputes between different
states;
and
in disputes, in which subjects or
citizens of other countries are
concerned
‹& in Cases of Admiralty
Jurisdn›
But this supreme jurisdiction
shall be appellate only, except in
‹Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)›
those instances, in which the
legislature shall make it original.
and the legislature shall organize
it.”

United
States;
to
all
cases
affecting
Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers
and
Consuls;
to the trial of impeachments of
Officers of the United States;
to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime
jurisdiction;
to controversies between two or
more States, (except such as
shall regard Territory or
Jurisdiction) between a State and
Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different
States, and between a State or the
Citizens thereof and foreign
States, citizens or subjects. In
cases of impeachment, cases
affecting Ambassadors, other
Public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall
be party, this jurisdiction shall be
original. In all the other cases
before mentioned, it shall be
appellate, with such exceptions
and under such regulations as the
Legislature shall make.”

On August 27 and August 28, 1787, the Convention took up
discussion of the Committee’s proposed Article X, and ten

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/8

44

Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai

2020]

QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE AND HARMONY

579

amendments were approved, indicated below by numbering and
bold-face:150
Art. X, Committee’s Draft151
“The Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court” shall extend to all cases
arising under laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States;
to
all
“cases
affecting
Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and consuls[;]
to the trial of impeachments of
officers of the United States[;]
to all cases of admiralty and
maritime
jurisdiction;
to controversies between two or
more States, [except such as
shall regard Territory or
Jurisdiction]
between a State and Citizens of
another State,
between Citizens of different
States,
and between a State or the
Citizens thereof and foreign
States, citizens or subjects.
In cases of impeachment, cases
affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and consuls,
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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Art. X as amended Aug. 27, 28
“The (1) Judicial power152 shall
extend to all cases (2) both in
law and equity153 arising (3)
under this constitution the154
laws passed by (4) the
Legislature of155 the United
States, (5) and treaties made or
which shall be made under
their authority156
to
all
cases
affecting
Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers
and
Consuls;
to the trial of impeachments of
Officers of the United States;
to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime
jurisdiction;
to controversies between two or
more States, (except such as
shall regard Territory or
Jurisdiction)
between a State and Citizens of
another State,
between Citizens of different
States,
(6) between Citizens of the

RECORDS II, supra note 12 at 422–38.
Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 423–24 (deleting the phrase “passed by the Legislature”).
RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 423–24.
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and those in which a State shall
be Party, this jurisdiction shall
be original. In all the other cases
before mentioned, it shall be
appellate, with such exceptions
and under such regulations as the
Legislature
shall
make.
The Legislature may assign any
part of the jurisdiction above
mentioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in
the manner, and under the
limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to
time.”

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

same State claiming lands
under grants of different
States157 and between a State or
the Citizens thereof and foreign
States, citizens or subjects. In
cases of impeachment, cases
affecting Ambassadors, other
Public Ministers and Consuls,
and
those
in
which
(7) the United States or158
a State shall be a party,
the supreme Court shall have
original
jurisdiction.
In all the other cases before
mentioned, the (8) supreme
Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction159 (9) both as to
law
and
fact160
with such exceptions and under
such
regulations
as
the
Legislature
shall
make.
(10) The Legislature may assign
any part of the jurisdiction above
mentioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in
the manner, and under the
limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to
time.”161

Id. at 425.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 437 (the only amendment adopted on August 28).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425 (deleting last sentence of the Committee’s proposed Article X).
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With these amendments, Article X of the Committee’s draft now
closely resembled Article III, Section Two as it appears in the
Constitution.162
James Madison recorded in his notes that he had expressed doubt on
August 27 about one of the amendments, what we have numbered
above as amendment (3):
Docr. Johnson [William Johnson, who held a Doctor of
Laws degree] moved to insert the words ‘this Constitution
and the’ before the word ‘laws[.]’
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to
extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising
Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited
to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the
Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given
to that Department.163
What might be inferred from these statements made by Madison on
August 27? First, Madison apparently worried that “cases” could be
interpreted as having such a broad meaning that adding the phrase
“cases arising under the Constitution” might go “too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court.” Second, Madison seemed to think that the
phrase “cases arising under the Constitution,” unless “limited,” could
be interpreted as extending to “cases not of a judiciary nature.”
The working draft before Johnson’s amendment already contained
the phrase “cases arising under laws.” Madison obviously did not think
that phrase needed to be “limited,” so it could not be interpreted as
extending to “cases not of a judiciary nature” because he was the
author and proponent of “cases arising laws.”164 Why, then, did he

162. The only substantive differences from Article III are that “controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party” has been added to what was approved on August 27 and 28 and jurisdiction over
impeachments has been removed as discussed below. See infra notes 179–190 and accompanying text.
163. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 430; MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 475.
164. See supra notes 59–81 and accompanying text (discussing Madison’s resolution, introduced July
18, 1787).
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apparently think that “cases” might become dangerously ambiguous if
the text was amended as proposed by Johnson?
This puzzle can be resolved if both “cases arising under this
Constitution” and “cases arising under the laws” were implicitly
understood by Madison to be functioning as shell-noun phrases.165 If
both are shell-noun phrases, then “cases” can definitely have a very
different meaning in each phrase. To illustrate, if “questions” is
substituted for “cases” (as the “and such other” provision and Wilson’s
speech suggest would be permissible), then it becomes more
understandable that “questions arising under the constitution” could
seem to be a very different exercise of judicial power than “questions
arising under the laws.” Madison’s assumption that “cases arising
under the constitution” might not be “cases of a judiciary nature”
makes more sense if “cases” is not tied to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “injured plaintiff litigation,” but instead functions to
introduce and characterize its shell content, “arising under the
constitution.”
In the printed version of Madison’s notes, the following sentence
follows the paragraph discussed above:
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: [Latin
abbreviation for “no-one contradicting”] it being generally
supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively
limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.166
It is somewhat difficult to interpret this cryptic sentence. Does it
mean the motion passed because Madison was the only delegate who
thought the phrase created by Johnson’s amendment, “all cases arising
under this constitution,” was dangerously ambiguous? Does it mean
the motion passed because all the other delegates—unlike Madison—
did understand the phrase to mean “cases of a Judiciary nature?” If
these are the correct interpretations, could it be argued from this

165. We know Madison was very adept at using shell-noun phrases. See supra notes 82–94 and
accompanying text.
166. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 475.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/8

48

Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai

2020]

QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE AND HARMONY

583

sentence that the Court is right to assume that the “all cases arising”
phrases in Article III only include “injured plaintiff litigation?”
To pursue this line of argument, one would have to assume that this
cryptic sentence reliably reports words actually spoken by other
delegates at the Convention rather than just Madison’s private
speculation for why Johnson’s motion passed, despite what Madison
reports that he said in opposition. To determine the reliability of this
cryptic sentence, it is then further necessary to examine more closely
when and how this sentence came to be written down.
The standard compilation of Convention records follows the format
of the print version of Madison’s notes and presents the cryptic
sentence in the same way as the paragraph that begins “Docr. Johnson
moved to insert the words ‘this Constitution and the’ before the word
‘laws.’”167 However, the National Archives Founders Online presents
this cryptic sentence as a footnote to the paragraph, noting the sentence
was “added” by “JM” (James Madison).168
An image from the original manuscript of Madison’s notes in the
Library of Congress, from which these printed passages were taken,
appears below.169

167. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 430.
168. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Aug. 27, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 157,
157–58 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds, 1977), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-020108 [https://perma.cc/TP8J-CRQZ].
169. James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 27, 1787), in RECORDS II, supra
note 12, at 426–32, https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutionalconvention-1787-8-27/# [https://perma.cc/635W-WA5P].
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In his preface to “Debates in the Convention” Madison wrote:
I chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other
members on my right & left hands. In this favorable position
for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms legible & in
abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was read
from the Chair [presiding officer George Washington] or
spoken by the members; and losing not a moment
unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of
the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes
during the session or within a few finishing days after its
close . . . .170
In his introduction to The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, Professor Farrand tells us:
“It is . . . very helpful to know that it was Madison’s
invariable practice in his original notes to refer to himself as

170. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 64, at 14–15.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/8

50

Ren et al.: "Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony" or "Injured Plai

2020]

QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL PEACE AND HARMONY

585

“M” or “Mr. M.” In the revision of his manuscript he filled
out his own name . . . ”171
This information would indicate the manuscript reproduced above
(where “Mr. Madison” is written out in full) is not a page from
Madison’s actual contemporaneous notes taken at the Convention;
rather, it is something that was written down later—at the earliest,
“during the session or within a few finishing days after its close.”
However, Madison’s own correspondence confirms that he revised his
notes after publication of the official Journal in 1819,172 more than
thirty years after the Convention.
The editors of the Documentary History of the United States, where
Madison’s notes were first published, interpret the manuscript as
reflecting the following revisions shown below by inserting
strikethrough for original text and brackets to show revision:
Mr Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to
extend the jurisdiction of the Court to [generally to] cases
arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be
limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of
expounding the Constitution to [in] cases not of this nature
ought not to be given to them in general by to that
Department.173
These alterations may have been part of the revisions made after
1819, and it is possible that the sentence about Johnson’s motion being
“agreed to nem: con,” which appears to be squeezed onto the bottom
of the page, was also made at the later date.
Apart from the risk that Madison was interpreting events long after
the fact rather than actually remembering what was said, the claim in
his notes that it was “generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature” presents other
problems. The phrase “cases of a judiciary nature” only appears three
171. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at xviii n.23.
172. Id. at xvi.
173. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17861870, at 626 (1998).
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times among the 136 million words of COFEA, and those three
occurrences all come from Madison’s one paragraph objection to
Johnson’s amendment on August 27:

In fact, the phrase “judiciary nature” only appears two other times in
COFEA, both times in documents written by James Madison,
suggesting the phrase may have been idiosyncratic to him:

If “judiciary nature” was a term coined and only used by Madison, then
it seems doubtful that the other delegates would have actually uttered
words like “we approve Johnson’s motion because we suppose that the
jurisdiction given is constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary
nature.” Further, as discussed below,174 there is clear evidence
174. See infra notes 208–212.
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contemporaneous with ratification that Madison’s primary colleague
in developing the language that became Article III—Governor
Randolph—continued to think that “all cases arising under the
Constitution” was dangerously ambiguous, providing a powerful
counterexample to the assumption that Madison’s doubts were
overcome by general agreement that “cases arising under the
Constitution” was “constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary
nature.”
Finally, considering what weight to give this cryptic sentence brings
to mind Justice Scalia’s definition of “original meaning”: “What was
the most plausible meaning of the words of the Constitution to the
society that adopted it—regardless of what the Framers might secretly
have intended?”175 One of the first decisions made by the Convention
was to keep all its proceedings secret,176 and Madison deliberately
chose not to make his notes public until after his death, decades after
ratification.177 As mentioned above, Madison himself advised that the
intentions of those who “prepared and proposed the Constitution”
should only be given “respect” as “presumptive evidence of the
general understanding at the time of the language used,” because “the
only authoritative intentions were those of the people of the States, as
expressed thro[ugh] the Conventions which ratified the
Constitution.”178
If the first reaction of someone as skilled in using the language of
Constitution writing as James Madison was to hear “cases arising
under the constitution” as giving the Supreme Court the “right of
expounding the Constitution” for not only “cases of a judiciary nature”
but also “cases not of this nature,” then it is hard to exclude the
possibility that the members of the ratifying conventions would have
heard the phrase the same way.

175. SCALIA, supra note 15, at 183 (emphasis added).
176. Daniel Webster, The Madison Papers, in 4 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 301, 301–03
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1856) (remarks made in the Senate of the United States on February
20, 1837, in relation to purchase of the Manuscript Papers of James Madison).
177. Id.
178. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 17.
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4. “Cases of Impeachment”
On September 8, 1787, as the Convention approached its final days,
a Committee on Style was appointed “to revise the style of and arrange
the articles which had been agreed to by the house.”179 Both James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton were members of this
Committee.180 The Committee transformed the jurisdictional provision
as amended on August 27 and 28 into Article III:
Art. X as Amended Aug. 2728181
The Judicial power shall
extend to all cases both in law
and equity arising under this
constitution the laws passed by
the Legislature of the United
States, and treaties made or
which shall be made under their
authority
to all cases affecting
Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls;
to the trial of impeachments
of Officers of the United
States;
to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction;

Article III, Sec. 2
The judicial power shall
extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made, under
their
authority;
—to all cases affecting
ambassadors,
other
public
ministers and consuls;

—to all cases of admiralty and
maritime
jurisdiction;
—to controversies to which
the United States shall be a
party;
to controversies between two
—to controversies between
or more States, (except such as two or more states;
shall regard Territory or
179. See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 179.
180. Id.
181. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 422–37.
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Jurisdiction) between a State and
Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different
States,
between Citizens of the same
State claiming lands under
grants of different States
and between a State or the
Citizens thereof and foreign
States, citizens or subjects
In cases of impeachment,
cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which the
United States or a State shall be
a party, the supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.
In all the other cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction
both as to law and fact
with such exceptions and under
such
regulations
as
the
Legislature shall make.

589

between a state and citizens of
another state;
between citizens of different
states;
between citizens of the same
state claiming lands under grants
of
different
states,
and between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign
states, citizens or subjects.
In
all
cases
affecting
ambassadors,
other
public
ministers and consuls, and those
in which a state shall be party,
the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction.
In all the other cases before
mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall
make.182

As indicated by bolding, the version reported out by the Committee
on Style contained only two substantive changes to federal
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was explicitly extended “to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party.”183 The other change was to
remove jurisdiction over impeachments of officers of the United States
from the federal courts.184
182. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
183. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Although technically a substantive change, this edit fell within the
committee mandate to “revise style” because one of the amendments approved by the Convention on
August 27, 1787, had added “cases to which the United States is a party” to the sentence creating the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”).
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Article X, Section Four, of the Committee of Detail’s draft
constitution stated:
The trial of all criminal offenses, (except in cases of
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be
committed; and shall be by Jury.185
Article X, Section Two had extended the jurisdiction of the
“supreme tribunal” to “impeachments of officers.” However, even
though the Committee on Style deleted this language and gave the
Senate the sole power to try impeachments, the Committee on Style
still retained all of this language from draft Article X, Section Four, in
reporting back to the Convention what is now Section Three of Article
III:
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where
the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or
places as the Congress may by law have directed.186
How could “cases” in Article III have a stable, inherent meaning
when it includes the use of “cases” in the phrase “cases of
impeachment”? Not only is impeachment not “injured party
litigation,” it is also not—in the words of James Madison—a “case of
a judiciary nature.” The Constitution confers on the Senate “the sole
Power to try all Impeachments.”187
Did the Committee on Style—staffed with such skillful and careful
writers as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Dr. William
Johnson,188 and Gouverneur Morris189—just forget to delete “cases of
185. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 187 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
188. See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 33. Johnson was regarded as “one of the most learned men in
[America].” Id.
189. Id. at 21. Morris was “probably the most brilliant member . . . of the convention . . . with a
wonderful command of language.” Id.
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impeachment” from the language of Section Three when the power to
try impeachments was transferred from the judiciary to the Senate?
Did the entire Convention also overlook such a mistake when
approving the final language of the Constitution?
Interpreting case as being used as a shell noun in Article III would
resolve such a puzzle. “Cases” appears eight times in Article III if
“cases” is assumed to be the implicit subject of the instances numbered
below as (2) and (3):
The judicial power shall extend
[1] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution,
[2] [to all cases, in law and equity, arising under] the
Laws of the United States . . .
[3] And [to all cases, in law and equity, arising under]
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;
[4] —to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;
[5] —to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;
—to Controversies between two or more States;
—between a State and Citizens of another State;
—between Citizens of different States;
—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
[6] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall
be Party, the [S]upreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction.
[7] In all the other Cases before mentioned, the [S]upreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.
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The Trial of all Crimes, [8] except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held
in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by
Law have directed.190
“Cases” could be understood as starting off with a vague, abstract
meaning each time it appears in Article III, a meaning that is only
completed by the information that follows it (indicated above for each
of the eight uses by bolding). Under this shell-noun interpretation, it
would have been perfectly appropriate for the Committee on Style to
continue to use the phrase “cases of impeachment,” even after control
of the impeachment process was moved from the judiciary to the
Senate because “cases” in this last usage in Article III did not have to
have a meaning at all similar to “cases” when used earlier in the
context of creating federal court jurisdiction.
5.

Cases in Law and Equity

Even if “cases” in Article III by itself did not have a stable, inherent
meaning approximating the Supreme Court’s interpretation (“injured
plaintiff litigation”), is it possible that the meaning of the complete
shell-noun phrase, “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution” does mean only “injured plaintiff litigation” because in
the final version of Article III, the words “in law and equity” appear
after “cases”?
The phrase “cases in law and equity” only appears thirty-nine times
in COFEA, and thirty-eight of these occurrences are direct quotes or
paraphrases of Article III.191 The thirty-ninth occurrence is a court
decision citing a book entitled Modern Cases in Law and Equity.
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
191. COFEA, supra note 23. A COFEA search for “cases” appearing within six words either side of
“law and equity” results in fifty-six occurrences, but when results lacking a grammatical relationship
between the terms are removed, what remains again are only quotes or paraphrases of Article III.
Searching by changing the word order to “equity and law” produces no collocation within six words of
“cases.”
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The phrase “law and equity” however, appears 397 times in
COFEA, while “law or equity” appears 412 times. The distinction
between “law” and “equity” was salient and well-known in the
Founding Era, especially to lawyers, as referring to two different types
of courts in the English legal system: “courts of common law” and
“courts of equity.” The leading legal treatise of the period,
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, devotes
hundreds of pages to describing the different functions and powers of
the two types of courts.192
As briefly explained in the Wex Legal Dictionary:
[T]he term “equity” refers to a particular set of remedies and
associated procedures . . . . These equitable doctrines and
procedures are distinguished from “legal” ones. While legal
remedies typically involve monetary damages, equitable
relief typically refers to injunctions . . . . A court will
typically award equitable remedies when a legal remedy is
insufficient or inadequate. . . . The distinction arose in
England where there were separate courts of law and courts
of equity.193
The phrase “law and equity” appears to have first entered the Article
III drafting process on August 27, 1787. According to Madison’s
notes, as soon as the Convention “took up” consideration of the
Committee of Detail’s draft Article X, Doctor William Johnson
“moved and seconded to insert the words ‘both in law and equity’ after
the words ‘U.S.’ in the 1st line of sect. 1.” This appears to have been
the first of the many amendments to draft Article X made that day,194
and its effect would have been as follows:

192. See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
193. Equity, Wex Legal Dictionary, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equity [https://perma.cc/S9HY-A8RR] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
194. See RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 428 (quoting the official Journal and Madison’s notes).
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The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States both in law and equity.
Madison’s notes indicate when Johnson made his motion at the
outset of the discussion of federal jurisdiction, he “suggested that the
judicial power ought to extend to equity as well as law.”195 Madison
reports that Mr. George Read of Delaware then “objected to vesting
these powers in the same Court.”196 Thus, it appears that “both in law
and equity” were understood to modify “jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court” rather than “cases.”
Unlike most of the amendments on federal jurisdiction, which
passed unanimously, adding “both in law and equity” was only
supported by six state delegations—barely a majority at that point in
the Convention.197 Two states voted no, and three states are recorded
as absent or abstaining.198 It appears this amendment was controversial
because the delegates understood adding “both in law and equity” as
expanding federal judicial power rather than narrowing it. As
described below, this understanding was consistent with discussion of
this provision at the Virginia Ratifying Convention.199
The official Journal notes that, after delegates accepted most other
amendments that day, another motion was approved to add “both law
and equity” before the word “arising”:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, both in law
and equity arising under this Constitution the Laws [passed
by
the
Legislature]
of
the
United
States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
195. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See 3 The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 565 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1836)
[hereinafter THE DEBATES] (emphasis added).
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Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls200
The Committee on Style removed the word “both” and set off “in
law and equity” with commas, giving us the version that appears in the
Constitution:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .201
Would the members of the state ratifying conventions have
considered “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made” as
extending judicial power more narrowly than if the phrase “in Law and
Equity” was not part of the text?
If inclusion of the phrase “in Law and Equity” was understood as
giving federal courts all the powers that existing courts possessed, that
understanding would have been inconsistent with a limited “injured
plaintiff litigation” meaning for “Cases[] in Law and Equity.” Robert
Pushaw has assembled considerable historical evidence that, during
the Founding Era, access to courts in both England and the American
states was not predicated on showing particularized injury.
In public law cases, a controversy was not required. A citizen
who had suffered no individualized injury could challenge
unlawful government action in a variety of
ways . . . . “[R]elator” actions authorized citizens with no

200. RECORDS II, supra note 12, at 425.
201. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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personal stake in a matter of public interest to prosecute as
private attorneys general.202
To a twenty-first century lawyer or judge, inserting “in law and
equity” into the phrase “all cases arising” makes it difficult to
interchange “questions” for “cases”: “questions in law and equity
arising under the Constitution . . . laws . . . treaties” may not sound
well-formed. However, Professor Pushaw tells us that “‘by 1770 the
power of English judges to give advisory opinions was well
recognized[,]’ [and] American courts [also] rendered advisory
opinions . . . .”203 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 specifically
required its supreme judicial court to answer questions from both the
legislature and governor:
Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and
council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the
justices of the supreme judicial court upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.204
As discussed in greater detail below, in apparent reliance on Article
III’s extension of judicial power to “all Cases[] in Law and
Equity . . . arising under Treaties,” at the direction of President George
Washington, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson submitted to the
U.S. Supreme Court twenty-nine very specific but hypothetical
questions about the interpretation of treaties between the United States
and France.205 Secretary Jefferson gave President Washington a
202. Pushaw, supra note 43, at 480–81.
203. Id. at 481.
204. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. II, ch. 3, art. II; see Pushaw, supra note 43, at 481 n.177 (quoting
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70
(3d ed. 1988)) (citing similar provisions in New Hampshire’s constitution).
205. Enclosure Questions for the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON
243,
243–47
(Christine
Sternberg
Patrick
ed.,
2007),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0164-0002
[https://perma.cc/8M78AX8R]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (July 19, 1973), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 251, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-020168 [https://perma.cc/M84K-32RA].
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subsequent status report, saying two of the justices “had called on him”
to ask whether the letter transmitting the questions “pressed for an
answer.”206 Jefferson said in his report that he told the justices “the
cases would await their time.”207
C. Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph’s Opposition to
Ratification
Madison was not the only important convention delegate who
thought “all cases arising under the constitution” was dangerously
ambiguous.208 Despite having proposed the Virginia Plan and having
served on the critical Committee of Detail that turned the Convention’s
resolutions into the Constitution’s final format, Virginia Governor
Edmund Randolph famously refused to sign the Constitution.209
In a letter to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates dated
October 10, 1787, Randolph explained his position that the
Constitution should not be ratified until, among other conditions, “all
ambiguities of expression . . . be precisely explained” including
“limiting and defining the judicial power.”210
In a subsequent speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, which
Randolph chaired, he made clear that his concerns about ambiguity
mirrored what Madison said at the Convention about adding “arising
under the Constitution”:
[T]here are defects in its construction, among which may be
objected too great an extension of jurisdiction. . . . It is
ambiguous in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive in
others. It extends to all cases in law and equity arising under
the Constitution. What are these cases of law and equity? Do
they not involve all rights, from an inchoate right to a
complete right, arising from this Constitution?
Notwithstanding the contempt gentlemen express for
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
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technical terms, I wish such were mentioned here. I would
have thought it more safe, if it had been more clearly
expressed. What do we mean by the words arising under
the Constitution? What do they relate to? I conceive this to
be very ambiguous.211
In this statement, Randolph, who later became the country’s first
Attorney General, interpreted “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under the Constitution” as extending the federal judicial power to
“inchoate right[s].”212 It is difficult to find an interpretation more at
odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “cases” as meaning
“injured plaintiff litigation.”
D. Questions for the Supreme Court on Treaties Between the
U.S. and France213
One of the most challenging dilemmas of President Washington’s
second term was maintaining neutrality in the war between Great
Britain and the revolutionary government of France.214
On July 11, 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson transmitted
to President Washington detailed written notes of a contentious
conversation with the French diplomat Edmond Genet. His notes
included the following statements:
[H]e charged us with having violated the treaties between the
two nations, & so went into the cases which had before been
211. THE DEBATES, supra note 199, at 571–72 (emphasis added). See the statement of William
Grayson, immediately preceding Randolph’s speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention:
My next objection to the federal judiciary is, that it is not expressed in a definite
manner. The jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the
Union is of stupendous magnitude.
It is impossible for human nature to trace its extent. It is so vaguely and indefinitely
expressed, that its latitude cannot be ascertained.
Id. at 565.
212. Id. at 572.
213. For an excellent background account of this dispute, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme
Court Nevers Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J.
473 (1998).
214. Id. at 488–90.
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subjects of discussion . . . says he, at least, Congress are
bound to see that the treaties are observed. I told him No,
there were very few cases indeed arising out of treaties
which they could take notice of; that the President is to see
that treaties are observed. and if he decides against the treaty
to whom is a nation to appeal? I told him the constitution had
made the President the last appeal. . . . I told him . . . we
would have enquiries made into the facts, & would thank
him for information on the subject, & that I would take care
that the case should be laid before the President the day after
his return.215
Jefferson repeatedly uses case in reference to the dispute over the
treaties, and while apparently recognizing that there might be (very)
“few cases indeed arising out of treaties” that could be “notice[d]” by
Congress, this case was to be “laid before” the President for his
decision.216
The very next day, on July 12, 1792, a “Cabinet Opinion on Foreign
Vessels and Consulting the Supreme Court” was issued over the names
of Thomas Jefferson, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and
Secretary of War Henry Knox.217 The Opinion stated in part:
At a meeting of the heads of the departments at the
President’s on summons from him, and on consideration of
various representations from the Ministers Plenipotentiary
of France & Great Britain on the subject of vessels arming
& arriving in our ports, and of prizes it is their opinion that
letters be written to the said Ministers informing them that

215. Enclosure: Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on a Conversation with Edmond Genet (July 10, 1973), in
13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 202, 203–04 (emphasis added),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0137-0002
[https://perma.cc/S3DS4GU5].
216. Id.
217. Washington’s cabinet had only four members. Cabinet Members, MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/cabinet-members/
[https://perma.cc/EKN6-2PRP] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The member whose name did not appear on
this Opinion was Attorney General Edmund Randolph. Id.
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the Executive of the U.S., desirous of having done what shall
be strictly comformeable to the treaties of the U.S. and the
laws respecting the said cases has determined to refer the
questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws . . . .
That letters be addressed to the Judges of the Supreme
court of the U.S. requesting their attendance at this place on
Thursday the 18th instant to give their advice on certain
matters of public concern which will be referred to them by
the President.218
Apparently what Jefferson described in his July 11th memo to
Washington as “the case to be laid before the President” has now
become “the cases” to be referred to the Supreme Court.
On July 18, 1793, Jefferson sent a letter to the Supreme Court
Justices enclosing twenty-nine specific questions that could be said to
be “arising under the . . . Treaties” between the United States and
France.219 In several questions (numbered below as they are in
Jefferson’s letter), he uses case:
3. Do [the treaties] give to France, or her citizens, in the case
supposed, a right to refit, or arm anew vessels, which
before their coming within any port of the U.S. were
armed for war, with or without commission?
5. Does the 22d article of the Treaty of commerce, in the
case supposed, extend to vessels armed for war on
account of the government of a power at war with France,
or to merchant armed vessels belonging to the subjects or
citizens of that power (viz.) of the description of those
which, by the English, are called Letters of marque ships,

218. Cabinet Opinion on Foreign Vessels and Consulting the Supreme Court (July 12, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 214, 214–15 (emphasis added),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-0143 [https://perma.cc/7MQY-6ZWS].
219. Enclosure Questions for the Supreme Court, supra note 205. The complete set of 29 questions is
posted in the online appendix.
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by the French ‘batiments armés en marchandize et en
guerre’?
6. Do the treaties aforesaid prohibit the U.S. from permitting
in the case supposed, the armed vessels belonging to a
power at war with France, or to the citizens or subjects of
such power to come within the ports of the U.S. there to
remain as long as they may think fit, except in the case of
their coming in with prizes made of the subjects or
property of France?
7. Do they prohibit the U.S. from permitting in the case
supposed vessels armed on account of the government of
a power at war with France, or vessels armed for
merchandize & war, with or without commission on
account of the subjects or citizens of such power, or any
vessels other than those commonly called privateers, to
sell freely whatsoever they may bring into the ports of the
U.S. & freely to purchase in & carry from the ports of the
U.S. goods, merchandize & commodities, except as
excepted in the last question?
8. Do they oblige the U.S. to permit France, in the case
supposed, to sell in their ports the prizes which she or her
citizens may have made of any power at war with her, the
citizens or subjects of such power; or exempt from the
payment of the usual duties, on ships & merchandize, the
prizes so made, in the case of their being to be sold
within the ports of the U.S.?
....
11. Do the laws of Neutrality, considered relatively to the
treaties of the U.S. with foreign powers, or independantly
of those treaties permit the U.S. in the case supposed, to
allow to France, or her citizens the privilege of fitting out
originally, in & from the ports of the U.S. vessels armed
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& commissioned for war, either on account of the
government, or of private persons, or both?220
He uses case each time as a shell noun. The recurrent phrase “in the
case supposed” is incomprehensible without its shell content, which is
the entire first question Jefferson poses:
1. Do the treaties between the U.S. & France give to France
or her citizens a right, when at war with a power with
whom the U.S. are at peace, to fit out originally in & from
the ports of the U.S., vessels armed for war, with or
without commission?221
The other two uses of case nicely illustrate the shell-noun pattern
“noun + of” discussed above. 222 In both instances case takes on
meaning only when combined with its shell content, marked by
bolding:
6. [E]xcept in the case of their coming in with prizes made
of the subjects or property of France?
8. Do they oblige the U.S. to . . . exempt from the payment
of the usual duties, on ships & merchandize the prizes so
made, in the case of their being to be sold within the
ports of the U.S?223
On July 19, 1793, Jefferson provided the following status report to
Washington:
Th: Jefferson with his respects to the President has the honor
to inform him that Judges Jay and Wilson called on him just
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See supra notes 99–105.
Id. (emphasis added).
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now and asked whether the letter of yesterday pressed for an
answer. They were told the cases would await their time, and
were asked when they thought an answer might be expected:
they said they supposed in a day or two.224
The interchangeability of “questions” with “cases” seen in the
drafting history seems to reappear here. Jefferson sent the Supreme
Court “questions arising under [the] treaties” but describes what the
Justices received as “cases.”
The submission of the twenty-nine questions to the Supreme Court
did not result in a published decision; instead, the following short letter
was sent to President Washington signed by five Justices. 225
Philadelphia 8 Augt 1793
Sir
We have considered the previous Question stated in a
Letter written to us by your Direction, by the Secretary of
State, on the 18th of last month.
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution
between the three Departments of Government—their being
in certain Respects checks on each other—and our being
Judges of a court in the last Resort—are Considerations
which afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our
extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially
as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of
calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive
Departments.
we exceedingly regret every Event that may cause
Embarrassment to your administration; but we derive
Consolation from the Reflection, that your Judgment will
224. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, supra note 205 (emphasis added).
225. The sixth Justice, William Cushing, was not in attendance at the Court at the time. Letter from
Supreme Court Justices to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 205, at 392, 392–93, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/0513-02-0263 [https://perma.cc/2MCM-RYER].
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discern what is Right, and that your usual Prudence,
Decision and Firmness will surmount every obstacle to the
Preservation of the Rights, Peace, and Dignity of the united
States. We have the Honor to be, with perfect Respect, Sir,
your most obedient and most h’ble servants[.]226
The Supreme Court has often expressed its interpretation of the
meaning of “cases” in Article III in terms of a prohibition on issuing
“mere” advisory opinions. For example, in United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell, the Court said:
As is well known the federal courts established pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory
opinions. [FN 19] For adjudication of constitutional issues
“concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not
abstractions” are requisite.227
Footnote nineteen cites the August 8, 1793 letter from the Justices to
President Washington.228
Indeed the Justices’ letter to Washington is almost an automatic
citation when the Court claims that Article III does not give federal
courts the power to issue advisory opinions, as illustrated by this quote
from Flast v. Cohen: “The rule against advisory opinions was
established as early as 1793.”229
However, despite the prevalent use of this 1793 letter to buttress a
narrow interpretation of “cases” in Article III, the Justices say nothing
in the 1793 letter about declining to answer the twenty-nine questions
because they do not present a “case.” Instead the Justices refer
generally to the principle of separation of powers, to the “impropriety”
of deciding questions presented in an “extrajudicial” way, and to
Article II, Section Two as expressly setting forth a method for the
President to “require” opinions from principal officers of his executive
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 80 (1947) (emphasis added).
Id. at 89 n.19.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 n.14 (1968).
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departments.
In contrast to the Justices’ silence, it seems apparent that George
Washington, who presided at the Constitutional Convention, and his
cabinet—which included Alexander Hamilton, who served on the
committee that finalized the Constitution—chose to handle the treaty
dispute with France as if the federal judicial power under Article III
did extend to deciding questions “arising under . . . [t]reaties.”
CONCLUSION
One of the most glaring flaws of the Articles of Confederation was
that the Articles supported only a very weak federal judiciary
system.230 When delegates gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new
constitution, they started out with high aspirations for establishing
courts empowered to “hear and determine . . . questions which may
involve the national peace and harmony.”231 The linguistic and
historical analyses presented in this article support a conclusion that
this aspiration did not disappear when “questions involving national
peace and harmony” evolved into a series of shell-noun phrases
introduced by the word “cases” instead of “questions.”
We hope that this empirical research, presented with a transparency
that allows all readers to “check our work” for themselves, will prompt
reevaluation of the Supreme Court’s assumption that the original
meaning of “cases” in Article III had the restrictive meaning of
“injured plaintiff litigation”—an interpretation that is inconsistent with
evidence of how those who drafted and ratified the Constitution
actually used language.

230. THE DEBATES, supra note 199, at 565.
231. RECORDS I, supra note 57, at 21–22.
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